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Canadians are not fond of hearing news about people losing their hard-earned 
pensions because their employer misused the money. The thought of some 
Working Joe or Jane being deprived of a pension, after a lifetime of working 
for a company, is naturally repugnant. That is why regulations around defined-
benefit pension plans are designed to force employers to keep their pension 
funds sufficiently solvent. But there are many ways to achieve that end and, while 
the rules that Canadian companies must follow might serve to help preserve 
pension savings, they also be very expensive — to employers and regulators — 
compared to other policies that can do the same thing. In fact, more flexibility 
in the rules might even make it easier for companies to offer richer pension 
benefits to employees than they already do.
Some of Canada’s outdated pension-funding rules have created the opposite 
problem: There are now pension plans that are actually overfunded if one assumes 
the company and the plan will continue. That means money the sponsoring 
companies could be using to hire more workers, to offer employees better pay 
and benefits, or to invest, is tied up in pension coffers. The problem lies in the 
divergence between a “going-concern” valuation — which assumes that the plan 
continues indefinitely — with the more prescriptive “solvency” valuation that is 
central to Canadian regulations. It examines funding adequaciy if one assumes 
the employer is going to go out of business (even if the vast majority of large 
employers are at any given time at no risk of that). In the days when fixed-
income returns were lucrative, companies relied on pension fund investments to 
top up the funds, reducing sponsor contributions to unsafe levels. The solvency 
rules required plans that were reaping higher returns in the stock market to 
continue making some contributions to their plans. Back then, the gap between 
a going-concern valuation and a solvency valuation was small, and so the rules 
were not an unacceptable burden.
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1Those rich returns are gone. Now, that gap between valuations has grown dramatically. 
In B.C., for example, a recent analysis found that when using a going-concern evaluation, 
75 per cent of 143 defined-benefit plans registered in the province in 2015 had at least 
100-per-cent funding, while the median funding ratio was 124 per cent. Using a solvency 
model, the median funding ratio was instead estimated to be a much lower 85 per cent. 
Closing that gap would require onerous pension contributions. More importantly, the 
contributions it triggers might never be needed to cover benefits.
Quebec is the first province to recognize that pension-funding rules need to be revisited 
and made more responsive, with new rules coming in that will reduce the unnecessary 
burden on employers while also adapting to changes in the economic environment. Ontario 
is showing signs that it will take steps in the same direction. Regulators everywhere 
should be revisiting pension rules to: remove the solvency-valuation requirement for 
well-funded plans, while allowing the regulator to assume a worst-case scenario in the 
uncommon case where they believe it to be warranted; to develop a method to rate 
the credit risk of a plan; to be less stringent and more realistic about plan liabilities (by 
allowing some types of liabilities to use a longer amortization period); but still restricting 
plan changes for underfunded plans. The result would not only reduce the cost and 
work of over-regulating well-funded, well-run plans, while freeing up cash . By reducing 
pressure on the cash flow for sponsors, and adding more flexibility, the policymakers 
will ultimately make defined-benefit pension plans more sustainable. They might even 
see defined-benefit plans making a comeback among employers who found heavy 
contributions enough to drive them out of the DB world.
2OBJECTIVE
This paper provides an overview of the issues surrounding solvency funding requirements in 
the regulation of defined benefit (DB) pension plans. The pages that follow examine the way in 
which regulation can best 
a) protect plan participants (consumers) against losses driven by decisions that are not 
within their control; and
b) aid plan sponsors in responsibly managing their pension plans, including preventing 
fraud and egregious mistakes. 
As always, those regulations should, to the extent possible, attempt to enhance the efficiency 
of the economic system delivering the pension. Reviewing the funding standards offers one of 
the most promising channels through which any jurisdiction acting alone can encourage the 
continuation of DB plan coverage for its citizens.
FUNDING DEFINED-BENEFIT PENSION PLANS
A wide range of approaches can be used to fund a defined-benefit pension plan. “Pay-as-you-
go” funding used to be common: where an employer would just continue to hand out pension 
cheques after someone leaves in the same fashion as it did while they were working. This 
worked unless a company ran into financial difficulties. The heartbreaking image of a hard-
working “Joe Public” who had put a lifetime into a company only to end up with none of the 
promised pension was socially unacceptable. To reduce the problem, both “carrot” and “stick” 
approaches have been employed. Income tax laws were changed to offer a carrot: namely, the 
addition of significant tax-deferral advantages for advance funding (with some limitations 
on maximum deductions). For the “stick,” minimum funding standards were developed and 
backed by the threat of losing the tax advantages associated with registered plans. 
A range of actuarial cost methods were developed by the profession in order to accumulate 
assets to fund pension promises “in an orderly fashion.” Essentially, these cost methods 
offered an array of mathematical methods from which could be selected an approach to move a 
plan’s funding from zero per cent when a plan was first being formed to 100 per cent over the 
working life of an employee. The names attached to these various methods have changed over 
time, vary from country to country, and may be different depending on whether the subject 
is being discussed by an accountant or an actuary. However, the simple fact remains that all 
methods theoretically offer an infinite number of paths to get from zero to 100 and many are 
appropriate. Those that have the plan sponsor pay as much as possible as early as possible will 
maximize the extent to which the retirement benefit is being funded with investment earnings. 
Those that have the plan sponsor pay as little as possible until funds become absolutely 
necessary maximize the cash flow of the plan sponsor that can be used for other purposes. 
However, only a few of the full range of cost methods are permitted in Canada today. Those 
that maximize early funding have been deemed to shelter too much income from tax. Those 
that delay funding too long have been found wanting by those drafting accounting standards 
as not providing a sufficiently close match between when a cost is incurred and when it is 
recognized on a firm’s financial statements. One specific accrued benefit cost method (ABCM) 
is prescribed for accounting purposes. 
3The implementation of a chosen cost method produces contribution levels that are measured 
against the plan’s specific liabilities. The report comparing the assets and liabilities is called 
an actuarial valuation. In the world of DB pensions, a plan sponsor hires an actuary to 
perform such valuations. The actuarial Standards of Practice recognize three primary types of 
valuations that an actuary may undertake when advising on the funded status or funding of a 
continuing pension plan: 
• A going-concern valuation: the actuary assumes that the plan continues indefinitely. He 
or she selects either best-estimate assumptions or the best-estimate assumptions modified 
to incorporate margins for adverse deviations. The valuation considers all benefits of 
which the actuary is aware, including contingent benefits, payable under the pension plan. 
• A hypothetical wind-up valuation: the actuary determines the funded status of a 
pension plan on the assumption that the plan is wound up at the calculation date. For 
this valuation, the actuary determines benefit entitlements on the assumption that the 
pension plan has neither a surplus nor a deficit. It must recognize contingent benefits that 
would be payable under a postulated scenario and may assume that the wind-up date, 
the calculation date and the settlement date are all the same. The hypothetical wind-
up valuation may assume that benefits would be settled by the purchase of annuities 
regardless of any limitation of capacity in the market for group annuity contracts. It uses 
the market value of assets and an explicit assumption for expenses expected to be payable 
to wind up the pension plan.
• A solvency valuation: The actuary performs a specific hypothetical wind-up valuation 
using parameters required by law and specifying a wind-up date.
The latter form of valuation, the solvency valuation, was added to regulatory requirements in 
the late 1980s as a supplement to the going-concern valuation that had been used to that point 
for regulatory as well as management purposes. Anecdotally, the concern being addressed by 
this was that an extended period of high investment returns was reducing sponsor contributions 
to an unsafe level. Clearly that environment has changed and the shift in the environment to 
one of longstanding lower rates of return is an important reason for this review. Gone, along 
with high interest rates, are the days when there was little difference between solvency and 
going-concern results. 
Background data have begun to emerge regarding the divergence between going-concern and 
solvency standards. The province of British Columbia has prepared what it calls a “snapshot” 
of DB plans in that province (Peters, 2017). Of the 143 DB plans registered in B.C. in 2015, 
75 per cent had a funded ratio of at least 100 per cent when going-concern assumption are 
employed; these same plans simultaneously produced a ratio of less than 100 per cent when 
the solvency assumptions specified in regulation are applied. More specifically, the median 
funded ratio was 124 per cent while the median solvency ratio was 85 per cent — a gap of more 
than 40 percentage points. Closing that gap can result in onerous pension contributions. More 
importantly, it can result in contributions that may never be needed to pay pension benefits. 
Thus the conclusion has been reached by this author that the time is right to revisit solvency 
funding rules.
4POLICY OBJECTIVES
Any review of a public policy needs to be conducted in light of the objectives the policy 
is trying to achieve. Funding requirements for pension plans are about managing the risk 
associated with the long-term financial commitments that pension plans entail. Generally, for 
continuing pension arrangements, the risk of future changes in DB plans lies with the plan 
sponsor — both upside and downside risk. 
However, that turns out to be an overly simplistic statement when a DB plan is changed or 
especially if it winds up. If a pension plan stops receiving (or earning) new funds, there is a 
residual risk that the funds it has in hand will not be sufficient to meet all promises; this is 
often the case when a plan winds up. There really are only two possibilities if one wishes to 
avoid calls for government or other external bailout when a shortfall materializes: 
 (1)  the sponsor can put in more money, voluntarily or otherwise; or 
 (2)  the benefits paid to participants can be reduced in some fashion that allocates the 
available funds across active members and retirees. 
The objective of funding requirements generally is to minimize this residual risk, i.e., the 
risk that promised benefits cannot be paid to participants. This is achieved by requiring the 
plan to maintain funding reasonably close to 100 per cent of the actuarial liabilities. The 
question is how best to define and measure the benchmark to which the 100 per cent number is 
appropriately applied. 
EVALUATING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN EXISTING SOLVENCY  
FUNDING REQUIREMENT
Does the solvency funding requirement achieve the desired policy objectives? Clearly the 
intent of this requirement has been to examine the soundness of a plan in circumstances other 
than those assumed in the going-concern valuation. Some measure of a plan’s robustness is 
undoubtedly useful — and especially vital is the ability to recognize when a pension plan has 
fewer assets than would be require to wind up the plan. However, I find no evidence that the 
specific parameters currently used in the solvency valuation provide an accurate measure of 
that exposure. 
If the current solvency funding standard does not achieve a meaningful measure of robustness, 
then maintaining it serves only to continue to examine one of an infinite range of possible 
futures (while also creating extra work for DB-plan administrators and actuaries). This 
exercise is inadequate in an era when almost every person has a spreadsheet on their desktop 
that is capable of running Monte Carlo simulations that would be far more informative. 
Sensitivity analysis should be encouraged for all plans as it has been in regulatory requirements 
that examine risk management of financial institutions. However, allowing a plan sponsor 
time to fund the largest source of plan deficits — past service credits or retroactive benefit 
improvements — is sound and it should not be treated punitively. 
It also is worth noting that removal of a requirement to test plan funding against a single set  
of parameters specified in law and/or regulation would be considered by most observers to  
be a classic example of “rules-based” regulation. Generally, such a regime has been replaced 
5in Canada’s system of financial regulation by “principles-based” regulation. Therefore, the 
proposed changes are in this author’s view consistent with the preferred approach of looking to 
principles first, and using those principles rather than detailed rules wherever feasible. 
ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SOLVENCY FUNDING RULES
If the current system is no longer appropriate, the next step is to evaluate possible alternative 
means to achieve the objective of minimizing residual solvency risk. Policy-makers could 
change the optics surrounding pension security by changing the underlying assumptions on key 
variables such as interest rate and mortality. However, changing the outward appearance does 
not change the actual solvency of the plans. Better alternatives are discussed in the subsections 
that follow. 
Eliminate Solvency Funding but Institute Safety Margins
Many actuarial processes include a provision for adverse deviation (PfAD). That concept has 
been used in other countries as well as in Canada for life insurance financial reporting for 
more than a decade as well as being part of the new Quebec pension legislation. The idea was 
surfaced for consideration in several of the provincial commissions that reviewed the laws 
around pension benefits in the 2007–08 time frame. See, for example, A Fine Balance (2008) 
that resulted from the work in Ontario and Getting our Acts Together (2008) that was produced 
by their counterparts in Alberta and British Columbia. 
The actuarial profession’s methodology for determining PfAD amounts in other contexts offer 
an excellent source of highly developed models in this area.
Quebec Approach
Quebec is the first province to step beyond conceptually recommending a cushion for pension 
funding. Bill 57 specifies the details of what there is called a stabilization provision. This 
amount would be required as a “top up” to the contributions determined on a going-concern 
basis. The bill, the product of a two-year consultation process that led to the D’Amours report 
(Innovating for a Sustainable Retirement System, 2013), establishes a stabilization provision 
using two measures as determined on the date of the plan’s actuarial valuation: (a) The 
percentage of assets allocated to variable-income investments in accordance with the target set 
out in the investment policy; and (b) an asset-liability matching measure, i.e., the ratio between 
the duration of plan assets and plan liabilities (Willis Towers Watson, 2016). The current 
service contribution must also be increased by a stabilization margin based on the scale. 
One can see from the table reproduced below that the lowest stabilization provision is required 
of the plan that has perfectly matched its assets and liabilities using a bond portfolio. This 
methodology for determining a stabilization provision takes into consideration the two major 
financial risks faced by defined-benefit pension plans: interest rate risk and market risk. 
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The key strength of this approach is that it prevents plans from taking extraordinary investment 
risk with pension funds without facing any funding / regulatory consequences. 
Ontario Approach
Ontario recently joined the list of jurisdictions that are legislating changes to the solvency 
funding rules. Bill 177, released On Nov. 14, 2017, contains limited provisions to reflect the 
new funding framework. The Ontario changes will require regulations (not yet released) before 
a more complete examination can occur. However, the addition of “provision for adverse 
deviations” as a new term in Ontario’s Pension Benefits Act offers another signal that Ontario 
is following the general trend set by Quebec. 
Evaluate Credit Risk Explicitly
As stated above, a stabilization provision of the type adopted in Quebec addresses interest rate 
risk and market risk. This list of risks faced by pensions is too short and immediately raises 
concerns about one other key financial risk. As the sponsor of a DB plan is responsible for 
its funding, any plan that is not fully funded faces a credit risk regarding the amount of that 
deficit. Specifically, it faces a risk of the sponsor potentially being unable to fund promises 
of future payment. This is, in essence, a credit risk with respect to the residual obligations. 
That risk is worthy of consideration separate from the market and interest rate risks that arise 
directly from the management of plan assets and liabilities. 
The field of financial-risk management has developed extensive tools to assess credit risk. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to recommend a specific credit evaluation mechanism. Indeed, 
some evaluation of creditworthiness is already employed by regulators in some jurisdictions 
when they evaluate requests to use letters of credit in funding a plan. No reasons have surfaced 
to question the validity of such processes, although a careful review would be needed before 
extending its scope of application more widely. This existing process could be used or modified 
to determine when credit risk reaches a level that warrants additional scrutiny. It is worth 
noting however that simply relying on rating agencies to decide that a company is in trouble 
proved woefully inadequate during the financial crisis of 2008–10.
7Maintain Hypothetical Valuations as a Regulatory Tool in Select Instances 
In order to provide appropriate levels of scrutiny in a wide range of plan designs and 
circumstances, regulators need a wide range of tools at their disposal. In evaluating the 
solvency of pension plans, the hypothetical wind-up valuation is one such tool. It should be 
maintained for use as needed. However, to be useful in the fullness of current and future 
economic environments, the parameters of the current solvency funding rules should be 
eliminated and replaced with a much broader set of possible parameters. Hypothetical 
valuations used in this fashion on an as-needed basis would provide a mechanism for stress 
testing the plan’s solvency. This, in turn, would empower the regulator to deal with plans/
sponsors experiencing problems without imposing additional regulations and corresponding 
effort on solvent plans/sponsors.
Establish a Pension Insurance Program 
Any relaxation of funding requirements for workplace defined-benefit pensions axiomatically 
increases the default risk associated with those plans. Another possibility that should at least be 
mentioned is a government-backed insurance program to replace some of the benefits promised 
by defaulting sponsors. Such a program is in place in the U.S. (the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation) and in Ontario (the Pension Benefit Guarantee Fund) as well as other jurisdictions 
around the globe. This sort of program would provide an element of social insurance against 
unforeseeable shocks that might hit a particular sponsor or industry. 
However, 40 years of experience with pension- benefit insurance programs has proven that 
it is extremely difficult to design a program that protects against the unforeseeable without 
becoming overwhelmed by problems that many would have considered foreseeable. Both of 
the North American insurance funds mentioned began with flat rates for plan participation, 
experienced huge issues of moral hazard, and subsequently went through a conversion to “risk–
based premiums.” It is essential for the viability of any such program that those participating 
plans that represent the highest risk be required to pay the highest price. We have sufficient 
experience with these programs (as well as deposit insurance programs) to state with certainty 
that sound policy design requires risk to be assessed on a plan-by-plan basis. Any scheme 
that forces sound DB plans to subsidize those that are less sound have been shown to provide 
another force that drives the sound companies to establish other types of pensions in order to 
leave the downward spiral. That option is neither recommended nor discussed further. 
CHANGES THAT COMPLEMENT AMENDED FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
A few related adjustments to law and/or regulation may warrant consideration concurrently 
with possible changes to the solvency funding requirement. 
Extending Amortization Period
Another proposal that has appeared over the past decade across multiple jurisdictions in 
Canada as a “temporary” solution to address pension issues is the extension of the amortization 
schedule used in calculating the solvency funding amount. This issue is indeed a question of 
8policy. Theory provides no single correct answer. Quebec’s 2016 legislation provides for a 10-
year amortization of deficits as does an order-in-council in British Columbia. Again, the reader 
can find a significant body of evidence and solid recommendations in the expert commission 
reports from 2008.
Initially, the public policy regarding amortization rules should recognize the three key types of 
supplemental liabilities to which such rules apply: 
a) liabilities that arise from the granting of past service credit in a new plan;
b) liabilities that arise from benefit improvements in an established plan; and 
c) liabilities that arise from the spread between actual results and ex ante actuarial 
assumptions regarding investment returns, mortality, turnover, and plan expenses. 
One important observation is that it is quite possible to use/allow different amortization periods 
for these different types of liabilities. Those of the first type tend to be large and generally 
result from the generosity of the plan and its sponsor. It seems quite reasonable if a plan is 
granting 10 years of past service credit to allow it to be funded over a period of 10 years. If the 
plan/sponsor is being more generous and allows a 15-year credit, it could be viewed as quite 
reasonable to permit the sponsor more time to fund that generosity. Allowing a firm time to 
fund larger benefits is entirely consistent with sound public policy. Indeed several decades 
ago this was the case in Canada with experience losses amortized over five years and initial 
unfunded liabilities amortized over 15 years.
When it comes to considering policy for benefit improvements, there is no simple comparable 
analogy for the years of past service granted. Rather, such a change is likely to be implemented 
by adjusting a parameter in the benefit formula, e.g., increasing 1.5 per year of service plan 
to 1.75 per cent. In a typical situation, such a benefit improvement is again an example of 
generosity. However, improvements can take such a wide range of different forms that it is 
impossible to generalize. About all that can be stated with certainty is that the amortization 
period should be at least as long as those related to liabilities of the type c, from the list above, 
but no more than of type a. 
Meanwhile the c-type liabilities from the list above arise not out of generosity but rather out of 
volatility. They tend to be smaller in value; over time these actuarial gains and losses tend to 
cancel each other out if actuarial assumptions prove reasonably accurate. In order to encourage 
plans and sponsors to minimize volatility by adjusting plan assumptions as needed, a five-year 
rolling average may be adequate. 
Selecting the minimum and maximum allowable amortization periods — whether the same for 
all types of supplemental liabilities or different for different types — is part of a larger debate 
concerning the proper amount of smoothing to use in financial analysis and reporting. The 
resulting proposal also should be reviewed in terms of intergenerational equity. A discussion of 
these two topics follows.
9Smoothing Debate
Trends and discussions around the globe over the past two decades have invested a considerable 
amount of time and discussion in the topic of “fair value” accounting. Eventually this 
discussion produced the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that have been 
mandatory in Canada since 2011. A cornerstone of IFRS is the use of market values for 
assets — a concept that is at odds with many of the concepts of smoothing that the actuarial 
profession has developed over the past century and applies regularly in pension valuation and 
reporting. In a sense, the accounting and actuarial professions have faced off on the question of 
how much smoothing is the right amount. Again, there is no single right answer.
In this instance, however, theory does offer a bit of guidance on how not to implement mark-to-
market methodologies. It would be ill-advised to employ a valuation methodology that utilizes 
the market value of liabilities and the market value of assets without any regard to how well 
those two are matched. Greater matching reduces the volatility that will be faced by the plan 
and mitigates the volatility that occurs separately in assets and liabilities. The duration measure 
found in financial theory examines the extent of this matching. It should be incorporated into 
any technique that employs the mark-to-market approach. 
As to the broader question of smoothing, regulators will have an important say in this debate 
when they elect whether to extend the amortization period for some or all supplemental liabilities. 
That is the primary mechanism through which smoothing is implemented in a DB plan. 
Intergenerational Equity
The five-year amortization period that has been used in recent history in Canada for a range of 
pension decisions is among the shortest found for any type of plan in any jurisdiction in North 
America. Still, one concern that arises whenever payment for something is delayed concerns 
intergenerational equity. Are we asking future generations to pick up the cost of the previous 
one? The answer to that question for most DB plans would be no. For example, extending 
the amortization period to 10 years would result in payment by the pool of current workers, 
unless a plan with a normal retirement age of 65 has an average participant age over 55, a 
situation that would be quite unusual. The question of intergenerational equity does not seem 
to be a significant concern that would arise by a doubling or tripling for the current five-year 
amortization period. 
Still, the issue of intergenerational equity needs to remain in the minds of policy-makers. Some 
policy options, including those discussed in this paper, implicitly place a higher priority on the 
security of benefit promises made in the past, while others prioritize the pension plan’s financial 
viability over the longer term. Different parts of a plan’s membership have a different stake 
in how this tension is resolved. Retirees and older active members have a stronger interest in 
securing benefits while younger plan members have a stake in the long-term viability of the plan.
Restricting Plan Changes
As stated previously, a benefit improvement is again an example of generosity. However, 
there have been examples of senior managers attempting to increase benefits in a plan when 
the sponsoring firm encounters financial difficulties. Whether done in an attempt to garner a 
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larger share of plan assets for the highly paid group, simply to steer remaining assets toward 
employees and away from other creditors, or select against a public guarantee fund, benefit 
increases sometimes do not pass the smell test. In order to protect the existing plan and its 
beneficiaries from the occasional nefarious proposal, I recommend the following: 
• Require a reasonable method be used for costing benefit improvements, e.g., the same 
going-concern basis (as adjusted) as required for the minimum funding standards.
• No benefit improvement should be permitted unless the plan meets least a specified 
going-concern (as adjusted) funded ratio. 
• Require that the sponsor’s funding policy address funding for increases in benefits as 
well as the basic amounts. 
Here again these recommendations draw heavily on those presented in the 2008 expert 
commission reports as those reflected considerable research and a sound thought process. The 
list intentionally incorporates good governance alongside sound financial theory. 
CHANGING THE REGULATION
The goal of amending regulation regarding pension funding is to maintain the effectiveness of 
that regulation in protecting pension participants while still encouraging sound management 
and removing barriers to plan startup and continuation. In all, I find that these policies deserve 
serious consideration by those charged with developing such regulation:
• Remove the current solvency valuation requirement for DB plans that are well funded.
• Maintain for the regulator an option to require a hypothetical valuation that examines 
wind up or any other circumstances presenting cause for concern. Their usage likely 
would be extremely rare. It allows the regulator to perform its function of ensuring the 
soundness of the plan without adding undue burden (including cost) to other plans.
• Develop a method to examine the credit risk to a plan. This may be as simple as 
incorporating a bond rating from one of several recognized rating agencies on the reports 
filed with the province.
• Extend the amortization period for initial plan liabilities as appropriate, considering the 
plan’s specific past service credits.
• Restrict plan changes for underfunded plans.
IMPACTS OF THESE CHANGES
Overall, some combination of the changes described above can be expected to improve the 
efficiency of the pension-funding regulation while simultaneously lowering some (but certainly 
not all) barriers to maintaining/establishing DB plans. 
• Removing the mandatory solvency funding requirement would reduce the administrative 
work (and corresponding expenses) for the plan, thereby making more pension assets 
available to pay benefits. Similarly, the need for the regulator to review two separate 
valuations would be reduced. 
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• Maintaining the value of hypothetical valuations in the regulator’s toolkit and designing 
a mechanism to examine the credit quality of plan sponsors will improve the quality of 
regulation at a minimal cost.
• Any changes that add flexibility to the funding amount and the timing of contributions 
reduce the pressure on sponsor cash flow and make a DB plan more sustainable. When the 
DB plan becomes more sustainable, that removes pressure to wind up existing plans and/
or convert them to some other form such as defined contribution (DC) or group RRSPs.
Finally, of course, efficiency would be maximized by harmonizing the modified requirements 
across jurisdictions. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Significant work has occurred over the last several years in understanding the risks of a 
pension plan. Leading the way are changes adopted in Quebec that directly recognize key 
financial risks in a pension plan’s portfolio, specifically interest rate risk and market risk. This 
is an improvement over the previous forms of solvency regulation because it is dynamic in 
nature, i.e., it has the ability to adapt to different portfolio compositions and different market 
conditions. It reflects well the principles of modern portfolio theory. Now is a good time to 
begin incorporating this increased understanding of plan risks into the way regulators approach 
their job of overseeing plan risks. 
Despite the progress in the management of portfolio risk and the opportunity to extend that into 
the regulatory sphere, public policy work to date has not recognized one other principal risk 
faced by pension plans: the credit risk associated with the sponsor’s ability to pay. Regulation 
could be strengthened by incorporating additional information in this regard and/or including 
that as a consideration in documents such as the CAPSA governance standards. 
In addition, several other changes in the regulatory environment appear to be compatible with 
an updating of funding requirements and any desired change should be implemented at the 
same time. The primary examples are adjustments to the allowable amortization period for 
supplemental liabilities and restrictions on benefit improvements by plans facing greater risk. 
Also, legislation has been enacted in several jurisdictions to permit target benefit plans; 
these provide an important opportunity for plan sponsors to manage the risk associated 
with a pension plan without the drastic conversion to defined-contribution plans. Offering 
an intermediate position that stops short of shifting nearly all risk to participants is a sound 
position to take — at least in theory. With any change so recent, however, it is possible that 
opportunities to improve implementation have surfaced. The superintendent may have received 
comments that suggest ways in which regulations could be clarified and additional questions 
answered to ensure clear and simple mechanisms to incorporate elements.
In the final analysis, both the public and regulators need to remember that funding policies — 
of both the trustees and regulatory authorities — do not affect the ultimate plan cost except 
with respect to the time value of money, i.e., whether investment earnings are inside or outside 
the plan. Changes that improve the way a plan looks on paper can be the worst kind of Band-
Aid —if they are simply obscuring a problem rather than solving it. 
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